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Abstract—Due to its scale and largely interconnected nature,
the Internet of Things (IoT) will be vulnerable to a number of
security threats that range from physical layer attacks to network
layer attacks. In this paper, a novel anti-jamming strategy for
OFDM-based IoT systems is proposed which enables an IoT
controller to protect the IoT devices against a malicious radio
jammer. The interaction between the controller node and the
jammer is modeled as a Colonel Blotto game with continuous
and asymmetric resources in which the IoT controller, acting as
defender, seeks to thwart the jamming attack by distributing its
power among the subcarries in a smart way to decrease the ag-
gregate bit error rate (BER) caused by the jammer. The jammer,
on the other hand, aims at disrupting the system performance
by allocating jamming power to different frequency bands. To
solve the game, an evolutionary algorithm is proposed which
can find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the Blotto game.
Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm enables
the IoT controller to maintain the BER above an acceptable
threshold, thereby preserving the IoT network performance in
the presence of malicious jamming.
Index Terms—Internet of Things; Jamming; Security; Game
theory
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) which will constitute a per-
vasive fabric that will interconnect a massive number of
machines and human devices is one of the most critical
technologies of the coming decade [1]. The IoT will typically
encompass a network of uniquely identifiable interconnected
virtual and physical objects, such as sensors, radio frequency
identification (RFID) tags, actuators, and mobile phones which
are able to communicate and exchange data with each other
to perform different tasks.
Given its large scale and the heterogeneity of its environ-
ment, the IoT is more vulnerable to security threats than
other networks, such as cellular systems [2]. Thus, security
requirements in the IoT will be more stringent than those of
conventional wireless systems. Indeed, in the absence of robust
security solutions, attacks and malfunctions in the IoT may
outweigh any of its benefits. Due to its large attack surface,
the security of an IoT system is prone to a variety of attacks
such as malicious radio jamming, denial of service (DoS),
side channel attack (SCA), replay attack, node capture, Sybil
attack, and wormhole attack [3].
In particular, IoT systems are vulnerable to jamming attack
which could make the battery of target devices to drain
quickly by disrupting their data transmission and making them
retransmit repeatedly. Moreover, jamming could also lead to
DoS which is the most common attack in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) and internet.
Several anti-jamming solutions for WSNs and other net-
works have been proposed in literature such as [4]–[7]. How-
ever, most of the anti-jamming and jamming-detection tech-
niques proposed for conventional communication networks are
not appropriate for implementation in the IoT systems for two
main reasons. First, IoT devices are resource constrained in
terms of memory, processing capabilities, and transmission
power and thus, are not capable of accommodating to complex
or high power-consuming protocols [8]. Moreover, distributed
anti-jamming algorithms which rely on nodes’ performance
are not practical in the context of IoT systems in which
the nodes are heterogeneous with diverse capabilities and de-
mands. Therefore, devising anti-jamming protocols which can
capture the specific requirements of IoT system is of crucial
importance for the security of IoT devices. Nevertheless, only
few studies have considered to address this problem.
The authors in [9] studied a scenario in which the nodes in
the IoT system possess different levels of importance based
on their betweenness centrality. A jammer aims at disturbing
an IoT network performance while remaining undetected by
deliberately limiting its interference power and at the other
hand, the IoT controller attempts at detecting the jamming
attack by providing each node with some information bits pro-
portionate to its centrality to announce its level of interference.
In the case of successful detection, the nodes under attack
increase their transmission power to overcome the jamming
interference. In [10], the authors proposed a quarantine-based
defense scenario in which the IoT devices report their level
of interference to the IoT controller and on the interference
level, the IoT controller may isolate the nodes under jamming
attack to protect the rest of the network. Thus, to detect and/or
confront the jamming attack, both studies [9] and [10] rely
on some level of cooperation between the IoT devices and
the IoT controller by using a distributed algorithm. However,
implementing a distributed jamming detection scheme may
leave the IoT system more vulnerable to targeted jamming
attack when the IoT devices are resource constrainted and not
capable of handling complex security mechanisms. Therefore,
there is a need for an anti-jamming mechanism which can
capture the specific requirements of IoT devices and accounts
for their limited computational and energy resources.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a central-
ized anti-jamming technique for OFDM-based IoT systems in
which the IoT controller must defend against a jamming attack
without relying on passive IoT nodes. The jammer attempts
to compromise the network’s functionality by allocating its
power over different subcarriers (tones) of the system so as
to maximize the number of affected devices. In our model,
unlike the work in [9], the IoT nodes are assumed to be
passive and resource limited and thus, they are not required to
increase their transmit power to mitigate the jamming attack.
Instead, the IoT controller responds to the jamming attack by
intelligently allocating its power over the subcarriers in such
a way that protects as many IoT nodes as possible. Moreover,
to address the jamming attack, the IoT controller acts alone
and does not require any cooperation from the resource-
constrained IoT nodes. The problem is modeled as a Colonel
Blotto game [11] with asymmetric resources between the IoT
controller and the jammer and different scenarios based on
the power budget of the IoT controller and the jammer are
studied. To solve this game, we develop a novel evolutionary
game-theoretic approach to find the Nash equilibrium (NE)
strategies for the IoT controller and the jammer. Simulation
results demonstrate the practicality of the proposed approach
in terms of maintaining the bit error rate (BER) of the channels
in an IoT system above an acceptable threshold.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
the system model is presented and the problem is formulated
as a zero-sum Blotto game. In Section III, a novel algorithm
based on evolutionary games is proposed to solve the game.
Simulation results are provided in Section IV and finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an OFDM-based IoT system consisting of an
access point (AP) and a set of N IoT devices connected to the
AP for communicating with one another and sharing data. The
IoT devices are connected to the AP over an IEEE 802.11ah
(low-power WiFi) protocol which is known to be a suitable
wireless solution for resource-constraint IoT devices [12]. Let
D = {d1, d2, ..., dN} and S = {s1, s2, ..., sM} be respectively,
the set of N IoT devices and the set of M subcarriers. Given
that the sub-carriers’ bandwidth is relatively small compared to
the total bandwidth of the system, the subcarriers are modeled
as flat-fading Rayleigh channels between the devices and AP.
We consider a jammer J which aims at disturbing the perfor-
mance of IoT system by transmitting over specific subcarriers
(tones), thereby interfering with the communication of IoT
devices and increasing their BER. Indeed, the authors in [13]
show that the BER of OFDM systems, such as IEEE 802.11ah
standard, is a function of the signal-to-interference-plus noise
ratio (SINR) over all subcarriers that are allocated to a given
user, irrespective of the baseband signal mapping scheme (e.g.
QPSK or BPSK). Considering the fact that the jamming signal
and the information signal are both independently attenuated
by the channel, the instantaneous SINR over a subcarrier s is
given by:
γs =
gAPs ps
N0 + gJs js
, ∀s ∈ S (1)
where gAPs and gJs are the channel power gains over subcarrier
s for the AP and the jammer J, respectively. Also, ps, js, and
N0, denote the signal power over the subcarrier s, the jamming
power over subcarrier s, and the noise power, respectively. The
noise power is assumed to be constant over all subcarriers.
We assume that the access point AP and the jammer J
have a limited power budget, denoted by PAP and P J ,
respectively. The jammer attempts at compromising the system
performance by allocating its power over the subcarriers so as
to degrade the received SINR and increase the BER. Suppose
that, to successfully transmit the information packets over the
subcarrier s, the received SINR γs must exceed a threshold τ .
Therefore, the condition of having a successful transmission
over subcarrier s is given by,
gAPs ps
N0 + gJs js
≥ τ. (2)
A. Problem Formulation
To thwart the jamming attack, the AP must distribute its
power over the set of subcarriers in an optimal way which
minimizes the effect of jamming and keeps the SINR γs
above τ for as many subcarriers s ∈ S as possible. However,
the AP does not have any prior information about which
subcarriers the jammer may decide to jam, and, thus, it has to
act proactively based on the past observations of the jammer’s
behavior. Analogous to [9], we define the AP’s payoff as
the number of successful transmissions over M available
subcarriers,
UAP (ps, js) =
1
M
‖ {s | γs ≥ τ} ‖, (3)
where ‖ . ‖ denotes cardinality of the set. Similarly, we also
quantify the jammer’s payoff as the number of unsuccessful
transmissions over M available subcarriers,
UJ(ps, js) =
1
M
‖ {s | γs < τ} ‖ . (4)
The utility functions in (3) and (4) show that the payoff
of each player depends on both its own power allocation
strategy and that of its opponent. Therefore, we can model
the interactions between the players in the context of game
theory which is a suitable mathematical tool to model such
resource allocation problems [14]. We model the problem
in the framework of Colonel Blotto game [11], which is a
fundamental model of strategic resource allocation in multiple
dimensions. In a Colonel Blotto game, two players compete
over a number of independent battlefields by distributing their
forces over these battlefields and within each battlefield, the
player that allocates the higher level of force wins. Formally,
the proposed Colonel Blotto game is defined as follows:
Fig. 1. The Colonel Blotto game: AP and J distribute their resources over
the set of M subcarriers.
Definition 1: The Colonel Blotto game which is labeled
as CB{AP, J,M} is a one-shot game between two players,
namely AP and J, compete by simultaneously distributing their
power over the set of M subcarriers subject to their power
budget constraints. Each battlefield, i.e. each subcarrier s ∈ S,
is won by the AP if transmission over s, as a function of power
allocation strategy by both players, is successful and is won
by the J, otherwise. The payoff for the whole game is the
proportion of the wins on the individual battlefields.
Therefore, we have a noncooperative zero-sum game for
which the Nash equilibrium is considered as a suitable solution
concept, where each player’s payoff is maximized given the
strategy of the opponent. However, the authors in [11] have
shown that the Blotto game has no Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Indeed, given any pure strategy vector, the opponent
can always modify its resource allocation strategy accordingly
to improve its payoff and win the game. Therefore, players
tend to randomize their choice among several pure strategies,
thereby employing a mixed strategy.
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the set
of all possible power-allocation vectors. Let f(x1, x2, ..., xM )
and h(x1, x2, ..., xM ) denote the probability distributions for
the vector of resources x = [xj1, x
j
2, ..., x
j
M ] allocated to the
subcarriers {si}Mi=1 by AP and J, respectively. Then, the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium over the power allocation vector x
is defined as,
UAP (f
∗(x), h∗(x) ≥ UAP (f(x), h
∗(x)),
UJ(f
∗(x), h∗(x)) ≥ UJ(f
∗(x), h(x)), (5)
∀f(x)∗ ∈ΠAP , h
∗(x) ∈ ΠJ ,
where ΠAP and ΠJ denotes the set of all possible mixed
strategies of the AP and the J, respectively.
Note that because of the a priori equivalence of all subcarri-
ers, the marginal distributions of the mixed Nash equilibrium
must be identical, i.e. f(x1) = f(x2) = ... = f(xN ) = f(x)
and h(x1) = h(x2) = ... = h(xN ) = h(x). Therefore, the
optimization can be carried out over the marginal distribu-
tions f(x) and h(x) [11]. Let F (x) and H(x) denote the
marginal cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of AP and
J, respectively. In our game, the AP seeks to maximize its
expected payoff subject to its power budget. Therefore, the
optimization problem for the AP will be:
maximize
F (ps)
1
M
M∑
s=1
∫ ∞
0
Pr
(
ps ≥ τ(
N0 + g
J
s js
gAPs
)
)
dF (ps)
(6)
s.t.
M∑
s=1
∫ ∞
0
psdF (ps) = P
AP , s = 1, . . . ,M. (7)
where (6) shows the expected payoff of AP and (7) ensures
that the total power of AP is restricted to its power budget
PAP . Similarly, the jammer seeks to maximize its expected
payoff according to the following optimization problem:
maximize
H(js)
1
M
M∑
s=1
∫ ∞
0
Pr
(
1
gJs
(
gAPs ps
τ
−N0)
)
dH(js)
(8)
s.t.
M∑
s=1
∫ ∞
0
jsdH(js) = P
J , s = 1, . . . ,M. (9)
where (8) shows the expected payoff of the jammer and (9)
ensures that the total power of jammer is restricted to its power
budget P J .
Note that the optimization problems in (6) and (8) are
coupled in the sense that any choice of H(js) in (8) will affect
the optimal solution F (ps) in (6) and vice versa. Therefore,
we can conclude that the solution of (6) is a probability
distribution F (ps) over the set of subcarriers which results in
the maximum AP’s payoff for a given strategy of the jammer.
A similar argument is applicable to the solution of (8). Hence,
the solution of the above coupled optimization problems,
(F ∗(ps), H
∗(js)) is a pair of probability distribution functions
which are the best response to one another. In other word, if
the AP chooses the strategy F ∗(ps), the jammer cannot do
better than selecting H∗(js) as its own strategy. Therefore,
(F ∗(ps), H
∗(js)) is the Nash equilibrium of the proposed
Blotto game.
The solution for Blotto games with deterministic payoff
functions can be found in [6], [11]. However, obtaining
the closed-form solutions to the optimization problems in
(6) and (8) is particularly challenging due the presence of
random channel gains gJs and gAPs in the payoff functions.
Nevertheless, we can acquire some insights about the set of
possible mixed strategy solutions by closely looking at the
problem. First, we note that, assuming gAPs = gJs = 1, if
PAP > M(P J + N0), the game has a set of trivial optimal
pure strategies for AP, with ps = P
AP
M
, for all s = 1, 2, ..., N ,
which results in a payoff of 1 for the AP and a payoff of
0 for the jammer. In other words, the AP has enough power
to keep the subcarriers’ SINR above τ irrespective of power
Algorithm 1 Proposed algorithm for solving the resource
allocation problem
Initialization: Each player i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} starts with an
initial probability distribution
repeat
for all player i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} do
compute the expected payoff according to ((10) and
(11))
for all player i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} do
(I)select another player i′ of the same type as i
if pii < pii′ then
i adopts the strategy of i′ {Imitation}
end if
select a random number β in range [0, 1]
if β < ξ then
Subtract small amount 2q from a randomly se-
lected point in strategy vector and add q to two
other random points {Mutation}
end if
end for
end for
until convergence
allocation strategy of jammer. Furthermore, we note that in the
equilibrium strategy, the power allocated to each subcarrier by
the AP is lower bounded by τN0
gAP
s
, because if the AP allocates
power in the range [0, τN0
gAP
s
], the transmission will always fail
in subcarrier s. On the other hand, J’s allocation is lower
bounded by 0 because it does not have any obligation to
distribute its power over all subcarriers.
III. PROPOSED EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM
To find the best strategies in the anti-jamming problem,
we adopt an evolutionary-based algorithm [15]. Consider a
population of size K = KAP + KJ of KAP players of the
type AP and KJ players of the type J. Players of the same
type have identical resources; however, each player may adopt
a different strategy profile. The strategy of each player i at time
step t is characterized by its probability distribution fi(x, t)
or hi(x, t) if i is of type AP or of type J, respectively. fi(x, t)
and hi(x, t) are probabilities of allocating x resources at any
given subcarrier at time t by player i. The Blotto game is
played successively between all pairs of opponents and, as
explained below, the players’ strategies evolve in response to
the resulting payoffs. At each time step, each player of type
AP faces the opponents of the opposite type and its expected
payoff function is given by,
piiAP =
1
KJ
KJ∑
z=1
∫ PAP
0
∫ PJ
0
UAP (fi(x, t), hz(x
′, t))dxdx′,
(10)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,KAP}
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
KAP 100
KJ 100
ξ 1.25× 10−3
PAP 1W
P J 100mW
M 128
N0 −90dBm
τ 25dB
Similarly, at each time step, each player of type J faces the
opponents of the opposite type and the its expected payoff
function is given by,
piiJ =
1
KAP
KAP∑
z=1
∫ PJ
0
∫ PAP
0
UJ(fz(x, t), hi(x
′, t))dxdx′,
(11)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,KJ}
The strategies of the players evolves according to their
expected payoff at each time step t. The evolution of strategies
is based on the following dynamical rules:
• Imitation: At each time step t, for each player i, another
player i′ of the same kind is randomly selected from the
entire population and their average payoffs are compared.
If pii < pii′ , player i imitates player i′ by adopting its
strategy fi′(x) or hi′(x), otherwise, the strategy of player
i does not change.
• Mutation: To increase the diversity of the strategy sets,
we assume that the strategy of each player i is subject to
a process of mutation with small probability ξ in which,
an amount of 2q is subtracted from the strategy of i at
a randomly selected point and the amount q is added to
the two nearest points in the mixed strategy vector.
In order to implement the mentioned dynamical rules nu-
merically, we discretize the resource variable x to a vector of
L equally distant points in the feasible intervals [0, PAP ] and
[0, P J ] for the type AP and the type J, respectively.
Note that in each iteration, each player’s strategy evolve in
response to the opponent’s strategy to maximize its payoff,
according to the coupled optimization problems in (6) and
(8). Hence, upon convergence, the proposed evolutionary
algorithm finds the best strategies of the players which are
the Nash equilibrium of the proposed Blotto game according
to the previous discission. Also, note that the imitation process
requires the players to constantly adopt the strategy of a better
player in each iteration. Meanwhile, the mutation process,
enables exploring a diversity in the set of strategies in each
round, which can help to find the best strategies for both
players.
IV. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
For our simulations, we consider an IoT access point with
power budget 1 W which distribute its power over 128 OFDM
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Fig. 2. The average payoff of AP and J according to the proposed algorithm
and random allocation strategy.
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Fig. 3. The evolution of AP’s mixed strategy. The power of AP for each
subcarrier is discretized to L = 5 levels to show the convergence of the
proposed algorithm.
subcarriers to confront a jammer with power 50 mW. The
SINR threshold for successful transmission over each subcar-
rier is 25 dB. For simplicity, we assume that the noise power
is constant over all channels of the system. Other simulation
parameters are listed in Table I.
Figure 2 shows the expected payoff of the access point
and the jammer as the players’ strategies evolve according to
the proposed algorithm. In Figure 2 we can see that, as time
evolves, the access point updates its power allocation strategy
and can effectively mitigate the jamming attack and securing a
reliable communication over 96% of time for each subcarrier.
For comparison, in Figure 2, we also show the average payoff
of the players according to randomized allocation. Clearly,
due to the lack of learning and adaptation, the randomized
allocation approach can save only 75% of the channels, leading
to a poor system performance in the presence of jamming
attack. Figure 2 shows that the proposed algorithm achieves
up to 30.67% gain over the random power allocation approach.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the mixed strategy for the
AP. For illustration simplicity, we assume that the AP’s power
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Fig. 4. Average defender’s payoff for different network sizes.
vector for each subcarrier is discretized to L = 5 levels in
the set {0, 4, 8, 12, 16} mW. In this figure we can see that the
proposed algorithm converges after a reasonable number of 20
iterations.
Figure 4 shows the IoT defender’s performance as a function
of network size for 3 different jamming power. As the number
of subcarriers increases, the access point has to allocate its
power over a larger set of channels. As previously discussed,
the power allocated to each subcarrier by the IoT access point
is lower-bounded by τN0
gAP
s
. Therefore, as the network’s size
increases, the IoT access point has less power to distribute
among the subcarriers in order to combat the jamming, since
it is required to provide the minimum amount of power, τN0
gAP
s
,
for all subcarriers. Figure 4 also demonstrates the effect of
the jamming power budget on the system’s performance. As
the power of jammer increases, the utility of access point
decreases which means that a higher percentage of channels
suffer a low SINR due to the jamming attack. However, as
seen in Figure 4, the proposed approach is able to protect
up to 95% and 85% of channels in the presence of jammer
with power budget 50 mW for a network size of 128 and 256
subcarriers, respectively.
Figure 5 shows the average BER of the sytem as a function
of the network size. In this figure, we can see that, by
increasing the network size, the BER increases since by
distributing the limited power of access point to a larger set
of channels, the SINR of each channel will decrease. Figure
5 also shows that for small network sizes, the jamming power
is the dominant factor in determining the average BER of
each channel. However, as the number of subcarriers increases
beyond 350, the jamming power has less effect on the BER.
Figure 6 shows the variance of the jammer’s power vector
[j1, j2, . . . , jM ] as a function of network size. It can be seen
from Figure 6 that, for small network sizes, when the AP has
enough power to allocate to all subcarriers, the jammer adopts
a high variance strategy. Under such strategy, the jammer
allocates either very small or very large portion of its budget
to different subcarriers, so as to compromise the performance
on a subset of those subcarriers. However, as the network size
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Fig. 5. Average BER for different network sizes.
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Fig. 6. Variance of the jammer’s power allocation vector for different network
sizes.
increases and the AP’s power is allocated over a larger number
of subcarriers, the jammer tends to select a low variance
strategy under which, it can compromise more subcarriers by
allocating more or less equal portion of its budget to a subset
of subcarriers, as the AP does not have enough resources to
defend all subcarriers.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of jamming in
an IoT system. In particular, we have proposed a centralized
mechanism to address the jamming problem in an IoT system
composed of resource constrained devices. In the proposed
model, an IoT access point defends against the jammer by
allocating its power over the subcarriers in a smart way
to defend the system. We have modeled the problem as a
Colonel Blotto game between the IoT access point and the
jammer. In this game, each player seeks to maximize its
payoff by adopting a randomized strategy to allocate its power
to the subcarriers. To solve this game, we have proposed a
novel evolutionary-based algorithm to find the equilibrium
strategies for both players. In the proposed algorithm, the
players adapt their strategies according to some dynamical
rules to maximize their payoff given the opponent’s strategy.
Simulation results have shown that the proposed algorithm
converges in a reasonable number of iterations and yields
considerable performance advantage compared to the random
power allocation strategy.
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